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Abstract
To this day, debates on ontological emergence have been almost exclusively
carried out within non-humean power-based or law-based metaphysics, the
main underlying stake being indeed whether or not irreducible causal powers,
or irreducible governing laws, can happen to come into being under specific
circumstances. It is therefore unsurprising that humeanists themselves never
felt that attracted by emergence, consistently with Lewis’ own dismissal of
“suchlike rubbish”.
In the present paper, I argue, contrary to this received wisdom, that
humeanism and ontological emergence can actually peacefully coexist. Such
a coexistence can be established by reviving some elements of John Stuart
Mill’s philosophy of science, in which a very idiosyncratic account of di-
achronic, evolutionary emergence is associated with extensions of the humean
mosaic and the correlative coming into being of new best system laws, which
have the peculiarity of being temporally indexed. Incidentally, this reconcil-
iation of humeanism and emergence allows for conceiving the autonomy of
the special sciences in an interesting way, consistently with the reductionist
ideal of a unified, all-encompassing science.
Keywords
Humeanism – Best System Account – Lawhood – Emergence – Diachronic
emergence – Special sciences – Unity of science
Acknowledgments
XXX
1
1 Introduction
To this day, ontological emergence has been almost exclusively debated
within non-humean power-based or law-based metaphysics. Typical discus-
sions involve dispositional essentialists or nomic necessitarians, who would
usually wonder about whether a case can be made that irreducible causal
powers, or irreducible governing laws, can happen to come into being un-
der some specific circumstances. Be they enamored with emergence or
rather partisans of reductionism, participants generally share a basic com-
mon ground in some version of the Eleatic principle, according to which
“to be is to have determinative power” (see e.g. Peacocke 2007; or Kim
1992 for a version restricted to causation). One of the main stakes of these
debates concerns the nature of the relation that ought to exist between fun-
damental physical entities and non-fundamental natural entities, as well as,
incidentally, the relation that ought to exist between physics and the so-
called special sciences. In this respect, it is the ontological emergentists’
recurrent contention that, whatever such relations ultimately are, special
sciences’ entities – be they objects, properties or laws – should somehow be
“efficacious” (Wilson 2015) or “determinative” (Gillett 2016) in their own
rights, to the effect that, granted emergence, the special sciences would be
at least partly autonomous from the physical sciences.
That such debates have been overwhelmingly played out in a non-humean
arena is no real surprise. For one thing, contemporary humeanists them-
selves never felt that attracted by emergence – consistently with Lewis’ own
dismissal of “suchlike rubbish” (1986, x) –, as it seems supervenience has
always been all they really needed. But it is also certainly true that, at least
until recently, most of the ontological emergentists out there happened to
pursue a personal agenda – e.g. vindicating irreducible agent causation in a
libertarian setting (Lowe 2008) or arguing that social structures have irre-
ducible causal powers (Elder-Vass 2010) –, for which, this is sure, humeanism
is of no help. As things stand, the humeanists’ systematic repudiation of
necessary connexions appears to be frontally at odds with the widespread
recognition that, typically, ontological emergents are supposed to come with
a decent measure of modal force.
Yet, notwithstanding Tooley-style arguments to the effect that the puta-
tive existence of yet-uninstantiated emergent properties should undermine
regularity theories (Tooley 1977; Armstrong 1983, chap. 8) – arguments
which, I think, have been properly debunked (Beebee 2000) –, advocating
the irreducibility of some worldly entities and, with it, the possible auton-
omy of some special sciences, doesn’t prima facie appear to be an endeavor
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that ought not to be pursued in a humean setting. What appears as a good
indication that such a claim is not totally unreasonable certainly is the fact
that, at present, it is rather standard to trace the very birth of emergen-
tism in the works of a philosopher, John Stuart Mill, who also happened to
embrace a broadly humean worldview (Stephan 1992).
Unfortunately, although Mill is usually seen as the main progenitor of
emergence, there hasn’t been many attempts to exactly explicate the way
in which he construed the notion. As a result, Mill’s view is often un-
apologetically conflated with other distinct accounts of emergence under
the unfortunate umbrella label of “British Emergentism”1. However, as I
will endeavor to show in this paper, Mill’s view on emergence turns out
to be rather idiosyncratic, and actually provides us with some unexpected
resources that allow, pace Lewis, for somehow reconciling humeanism with
(ontological) emergence.
Digging out Mill’s philosophy of emergence and emphasizing the extent
to which it happens to conflict with its standard contemporary interpre-
tation can certainly have some historical interest, but it is not what will
primarily keep me busy here. The main purpose of the present paper is
rather to use Mill’s scattered insights on emergence as guides towards the
establishment of a peaceful coexistence between humeanism and emergence.
As a secondary objective, I also show that some peculiar form of ontolog-
ical emergence allows for conceiving the autonomy of the special sciences
in an interesting way, consistently with the reductionist ideal of a unified,
all-encompassing science. Incidentally, in a companion paper to come, such
a conception will be claimed to strengthen a recent variant of the humean
Best System Account of lawhood, known as the “Better Best System Ac-
count” [BBSA] (Schrenk 2008; Cohen & Callender 2009), for which, it has
been contented, John Stuart Mill is to be considered the “patron saint” (in-
cidentally warranting the claim that, in a certain sense, humeanism isn’t
necessarily hostile to emergentism; Schrenk 2017).
Here is how the discussion is going to be structured. In section 2, I
first describe the main tenets that define Mill’s broadly humean worldview
and, more particularly, his specific take on lawhood. In section 3, I intro-
duce Mill’s notorious distinction between “homopathic” and “heteropathic”
combinations of causes and laws, on which the current “resultant/emergent”
1Although McLaughlin (1992)’s important contribution to the study of the history of
emergentism is respectful to the diversity of the different views that participated to such
an emergentism, the convenient label of “British emergentism” that he coined has been
subsequently used with the implicit and detrimental suggestion that all the emergentists
involved – from Mill to Broad – were sharing one and the same construal of emergence.
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distinction is usually considered to collapse. I then proceed by extracting
the ontological consequences of the putative existence in nature of hetero-
pathic effects and laws, by showing that they are to be related to extensions
of the humean mosaic (section 4) and, with it, a conception of ultimate
laws as being temporally indexed (section 5). On this basis, I propose a
synthetical and evolutionary reconstruction of Mill’s view on the “growing
humean mosaic” and the way it gives rise to a unified science, somewhat
paradoxically made of autonomous special sciences (section 6). I close this
paper by proposing semi-formal definitions of Mill’s emergence that allow
to localize it in the very diverse, contemporary conceptual landscape of the
notion (section 7).
Before getting started, a note of caution is needed. It is notoriously dif-
ficult to exactly pin down Mill’s ontological commitments – most of which
being broadly humean while some having rather elusive realistic tones –, as
he himself investigated the logic of science rather than its underlying meta-
physics. In this respect, the reconstructions found in this paper are by no
means meant as thorough scholarly exegeses of Mill’s philosophy of science.
More modestly, I merely propose a plausible picture of the reconciliation be-
tween humeanism and emergence that is consistent with Mill’s view, filling
the gaps, when necessary, in ways that are as charitable as possible.
2 Lawhood in humeanism
For the purpose of the present paper, it is enough to delineate Mill’s broadly
humean worldview with the help of the three following features2:
2I take events (understood as property instances) to be the units of the humean mosaic
as well as the relata of causal relations and laws. This choice is certainly conventional, and
is partly motivated by a willingness to render Mill’s view on lawhood commensurate with
subsequent discussions on emergence. Also, it should be emphasized from the outset that
humeanism is here understood in a broader, less restricted sense than typical Lewisian
humeanism. In particular – and as we’ll see –, nothing in humeanism itself should prima
facie force us to adopt a counterfactual analysis of causation, an eternalist theory of time
or a physicalist ontology. Finally, although endorsements of the regularity views of laws
and causation aren’t difficult to spot in Mill’s works, bringing to light his commitment
to humean supervenience is certainly more indirect. This can actually be achieved by
stressing Comte’s notorious influence on Mill, whose very philosophical project was to
render science “positive”. Such an endeavor notably required getting rid of obscure ideas
as “forces”, which simply are the relic of the metaphysical age of science, when godly,
extra-natural influences, hallmarks of the previous and bygone theological age, have been
materialized. And it turns out that it is precisely because forces are so rejected that all
there is left are humean patterns of events (Millgram 2009).
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• Humean supervenience [HS] – The world is some sort of a vast
mosaic of property instances localized at spatio-temporal points. Ev-
erything else that is not immediately part of such a mosaic supervenes
on it. The property instances composing the mosaic are taken to be
(i) fundamental and (ii) non-modal, to the effect that (i) every nat-
ural property instance only obtains in virtue of the instantiation of
some of these fundamental properties, and (ii) no property instance
that belongs to the mosaic is modally connected to other property
instances.
• Regularity view of laws [RVL] – Laws do not govern the succes-
sion of particular events of the mosaic. Rather, and in accordance
with [HS], they simply are patterns or regularities (of a special sort)
among them. Lawful regularities are described by law statements,
which figure in scientific theories.
• Regularity view of causation [RVC] – Causation is not productive.
It is rather a relation of constant conjunction between discrete events
of the mosaic. Consistently with [HS] and as with [RVL], there is
no (natural) modality in such relation. Causation just is the regular
succession in time of particular events3.
With respect to [RVL], the very fact that a distinction can be made be-
tween laws (of nature) and law statements is indicative of a realist facet of
Mill’s philosophy of science, according to which science is in the business
of revealing the way the world essentially is (Macleod 2017). Mill himself
acknowledges the possible confusion that follows from this: “[T]he expres-
sion, Laws of nature, means nothing but the uniformities which exist among
natural phenomena [...]” (1884, 208, italics in the original), yet “[i]t is the
custom of science [...] to call the general proposition which expresses the
nature of that regularity a law [...]” (1884, 207).
3True, it has been claimed that Mill’s view on causation may be taken to be in line
with metaphysical frameworks that posit powers or capacities in nature (Cartwright 1989),
an exegesis often substantiated by Mill’s own contention that “[t]hese facts are correctly
indicated by the expression tendency. All laws of causation, in consequence of their liability
to be counteracted, require to be stated in words affirmative of tendencies only, and not of
actual results” (1884, 293; italics in the original). Yet, I think that such a reconstruction
has been properly debunked (Schmidt-Petri 2008), Mill using the term “tendency” for
methodological rather than metaphysical reasons, only in those situations where it makes
sense to talk about causes that are impeded by other causes. As things stand, Mill can
even be considered to have offered a sophisticated version of [RVC] (Psillos 2002).
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Now, the orthodoxy has it that Mill is the pioneering proponent of a
particular variant of [RVL] – although with the slight realistic tone just
mentioned –, namely the so-called “Mill-Ramsey-Lewis” or Best System Ac-
count [BSA] of lawhood (Earman 1986). Among other features, such an
account provides a principled way of distinguishing between those regular-
ities that appear to be merely accidental, and which are accordingly to be
captured by accidentally true generalizations, from those regularities that
turn out to be genuinely nomic and, as such, describable by law statements.
Such a distinction can in principle be drawn through the running of some
kind of competition between all the available deductive systems that con-
cern the property instances composing the humean mosaic, and of which
the theorems are true. It is the [BSA]’s main contention that the laws just
are the axioms and the theorems of the one system that achieves the best
balance between two virtues that generally tend to work against one an-
other, namely strength – a measure of informativeness – and simplicity – a
measure of the sobriety of systematization.
Still, in Mill’s own view (1884, 206-207), referring to the axioms and the
theorems of such a best system as “laws” amounts to a “lax application”
of the term. A stricter application would be to consider as laws only those
regularities that are “distinct” and “independent”, such that, when they are
taken for granted, “the others follow” or “result from them”. Put differently,
Mill is actually considering two different kinds of law: (i) the genuine ones,
which are the invariant and unconditional regularities that obtain among
the fundamental property instances of the humean mosaic, and which are
to be captured by law statements that are the axioms of the best deductive
system that is true to the mosaic, and (ii) the derivative ones, which are
regularities that obtain in virtue of those fundamental regularities, and that
are describable by law statements that are deducible from the axioms, that
is, by the theorems of the best system. For the sake of simplicity, and
bearing in mind that, according to Mill, only the former are to be considered
as the laws – coherently with the claim that the laws are “the fewest general
propositions from which all the uniformities which exist in the universe might
be deductively inferred” (1884, 207) –, I’ll keep referring in what follows to
the distinction between the laws captured by the axioms and the theorems
as, respectively, the “ultimate” (or fundamental) laws versus the “derivative”
(or non-fundamental) laws.
This being said, it might prima facie appear that such an account of law-
hood makes it difficult, if not impossible, to take seriously the very existence,
yet alone the autonomy, of laws in the special sciences, insofar as such laws
are supposed not to be directly about the fundamental property instances
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of the humean mosaic. As things stand, one can indeed have serious reasons
to expect that, while running the competition between the available deduc-
tive systems that are true to the mosaic, the generalizations of the special
sciences will at best invariably come out only as theorems of the winning
system, that is, as mere derivative laws. However, Mill’s philosophy of sci-
ence presents a further resource that makes this judgment premature. It is
indeed an idiosyncrasy of Mill’s view that his version of the [BSA] – in sharp
contrast with Lewis’ – comes hand in hand with some non-trivial form of
antireductionism, something one can only fully appreciate with an adequate
account of Mill’s emergence at hand.
3 Combining causes and combining laws
In the book on induction that is part of his System of Logic, Mill discusses
what he takes to be “one of the fundamental distinctions in nature” (1884,
244), which is about two different modes of composition of causes or, equiv-
alently, of mutual interference between laws. The first mode, referred to as
“homopathic”, is very general. It obtains as long as the Principle of the
Composition of Causes [PCC] is satisfied, that is, as long as “the joint effect
of several causes is identical with the sum of their separate effects” (1884,
243). [PCC] continuously obtains for phenomena studied by the science of
mechanics. It is actually embodied in Newton’s second law F = ma, where
the resulting effect a of the joint action F of several causes Fi is indeed
always identical with the (vectorial) sum of the partial effects ai that each
of these causes would have had in isolation. In corresponding nomological
terms, the law about the joint cause and effect F = ma is identical to each
of the laws about the separate causes and effects Fi = mai, insofar as these
do not “interfere” with one another while they combine.
According to Mill, it is an empirical, contingent matter of fact that
[PCC] does exceptionally fail, to the effect that causes sometimes happen
to combine, and laws happen to interfere, in a “heteropathic” way4. In that
kind of situation, which typically occurs on the occasion of chemical reac-
tions, the joint effect of combined causes is not identical to the sum of the
separate effects that these causes would have had on their own. As Mill
puts it himself with respect to the synthesis of water from (di)hydrogen and
(di)oxygen: “Not a trace of the properties of hydrogen or of oxygen is ob-
4It is George Henry Lewes who later renamed Mill’s homopathic/heteropathic distinc-
tion into the “resultant/emergent” terminology more commonly used nowadays.
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servable in those of their compound, water” (1884, 243)5. In corresponding
nomological terms, the law about the joint cause and effect is different from
the laws about the separate causes and effects. Water can then be at play
in nomic regularities that are “heterogeneous” with regard to any of the
nomic regularities in which hydrogen and oxygen happen to find themselves
at play.
This being said, one may wonder why it is the case that any failure of
[PCC], that is, any heteropathic composition of cause, amounts to what one
would be ready to consider as a non-trivial form of emergence. In a nutshell,
this relies on two complementary observations. Each breach in [PCC] is the
occasion of (i) an extension of the humean mosaic, that is, the advent of new
fundamental property instances that belong to a new ontological domain,
and (ii) the correlative advent of new ultimate laws that acts as bridge-
laws between the old and the new domains. Let us now flesh out these
observations in more detail.
4 Emergence and the growing humean mosaic
As a starting point, Fig. 1 provides a diagrammatical representation of
the general, homopathic situation. Although it is true that Mill invariably
speaks of causal composition in terms of addition, scalar or otherwise, one
can easily generalize to any other kind of combinatorial relation, hence the
neutral notation R(x1i , x2i , x3i )6. The only thing that really matters is that,
in the homopathic case, it is the same relation R that holds for both the
combinations of causes and effects. Indeed, it is only in this respect that
the same laws obtain for both joint and separate causes and effects. In
the light of the canonical mechanical illustration again, it is because both
forces and acceleration combine in the same way, viz. additively, that we
have that F = ∑Fi = m∑ai = ma. From this, it follows that it is
always possible to anticipate the occurrence of any homopathic effect. From
knowledge of [PCC], the laws Lk[cki , ekj ] that are about the separate causes
and effects as well as the relation R in which the causes stand with respect
to one another at time ti, one can indeed predict the occurrence of Ej at
5This kind of observation certainly is at the very root of the traditional association of
emergence with the holist slogan according to which “the whole is more than the sum of
its parts”. Yet, as we’ll see shortly, such an association can be misleading.
6For the sake of uniformity, I will continue using subscripts i, j and k as temporal
indications, xi being the instantiation of x at time ti. Superscripts are mere identification
labels. Expressions like xn are used to denote either the n-th x or all possible xi (with i
being any integer from 1 to n), depending on the context.
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tj . Equivalently, the law L[Ci, Ej ] is a derivative law. Accordingly, and to
state the obvious, Ej is not a fundamental property instance of the humean
mosaic. Rather, it only obtains in virtue of the instantiation of the other
fundamental property instances ekj standing in relation R. Ej is thus nothing
“over and above” the instantiation of each ekj standing in relation R. In
contrast with the heteropathic case – and as we’ll see shortly –, all the
separate causes therefore “have their full effect” (Mill 1884, p. 243).
Figure 1: Homopathic composition of causes and effects.
Let’s now turn to the emergent case, in which [PCC] breaks down, that is,
in which the joint effect Ej is not identical to the separate effects ekj standing
in relation R (or, for that matter, in any relation R∗; see Fig. 2). In that
kind of case – and this is the crux of the idiosyncrasy of Mill’s emergence
that is often overlooked –, the separate effects ekj simply don’t exist (at
least in the spatio-temporal region of the phenomena under consideration),
to the effect that an heteropathic combination of causes can be seen as a
process during which some due effects unexpectedly give way to something
utterly different. As Mill puts it himself (1884, 246): “At some particular
points in the transition from separate to united action, the laws change, and
an entirely new set of effects [...] take place of those which arise from the
separate agency of the same causes”7. Accordingly, an heteropathic effect
Ej always is a new fundamental property instance of the humean mosaic, or,
7It is noteworthy that Mill also envisioned the possibility that the existence of the joint
effect Ej is “added to”, instead of replacing, the one of the separate effects ekj . Because
this possible variant has no impact on the facts that matter here, namely that Ej is a new
fundamental property instance of the humean mosaic and the corresponding heteropathic
law is to be conceived of as ultimate, I don’t explore this option further. Also, that
laws might “change” or “interfere” with other laws should not be taken too literally, as
this is not something that humean laws can do. More precisely, as we will see in section
5, though individual laws don’t change upon emergence, it is the case that the set of
laws that best captures the humean mosaic happens to grow. Finally, that the separate
effects ekj aren’t necessarily instantiated at time tj seems to be indicative of the fact that
an essential condition of causation encapsulated in Mill’s version of [RVC] breaks down,
namely that causes must be followed by their effects “unconditionally” (1884, 222), to the
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to put it differently, it does not exist in virtue of anything else than itself.
Neither does it exist in virtue of its cause Ci, given [RVC] and its underlying
assumption that, so to speak, no cause contains the seed of – or produces –
its effect. Nor does it exist in virtue of – or, nor does is supervene on –
the separate effects ekj , for these are generally not co-instantiated. True, the
very fact that an heteropathic effect Ej is not grounded in putatively more
fundamental property instances doesn’t prevent it from being instantiated in
systems whose formation depends in some sense on a previous constellation
of conditions. Although in Mill’s empiricist perpective the liquidity of water
is genuinely heterogeneous from the gaseous nature of hydrogen and oxygen
– to the effect that one couldn’t recognize the relevant traces of the later in
the former –, it is indeed still the case that liquid water is what regularly
proceeds from a transformation of hydrogen and oxygen in the appropriate
conditions. The apparent air of contradiction here is typical of emergentism,
which generally requires one to be committed to the somewhat paradoxical
idea that emergent property instances can at the same time be dependent
(on what constitutes their emergence bases) and fundamental8.
Figure 2: Heteropathic composition of causes and effects. The shaded region is
non-occurrent, to the effect that Ej cannot be any relation R∗ – and, in particular,
R – of the ekj .
It follows that every instance of Mill’s emergence is the occasion of an
extension of the humean mosaic. Under Mill’s view, the mosaic happens
to grow through time, as new semi-autonomous domains of fundamental
emergent property instances are frequently added to the whole picture. As
we’ll see in what follows, each of these extensions of the mosaic corresponds
to the advent of a new domain that is definable of a special science.
effect that one may wonder whether heteropathic causes are to be considered causes at
all. A possible way out of this problem seems to have been envisioned by Mill himself,
who suggested that heteropathic cases should be construed as “transformational” rather
than causal stricto sensu, on the model of water being the product of a transformation of
hydrogen and oxygen (e.g. 1884, 290-291; see also section 7). I thank Paul Humphreys
and an anonymous reviewer for having brought my attention on this.
8On this general point, see Barnes (2012).
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5 Temporally indexed laws and the autonomy of
the special sciences
Given [HS] and [RVL], it follows from each extension of the humean mosaic
that new laws are needed to systematize each new domain and its constitu-
tive fundamental property instances. It is indeed the main initial underlying
assumption of the heteropathic mode of interference between laws that, upon
emergence, laws of nature, “when called upon to work together, cease and
give place to others” (1884, 244). Such new laws, actually L(Ci, Ej) in the
simplified case depicted on Fig. 2, are to be considered ultimate, in the
sense that they cannot be deduced from any combination of other laws (in
particular, the laws Lk[cki , ekj ], even together with [PCC] and knowledge of
how the separate causes cki happen to be related). As a result, the occur-
rence of every emergent property instance Ej is theoretically unpredictable,
despite the fact that, given Mill’s commitment to determinism (1884, 201),
it can of course be inductively predicted as soon as L(Ci, Ej) has come to be
known as the outcome of an adequate experiment. Mill’s emergence there-
fore comes with the contention that all of science’s first principles are not
“first” at all, at least in a temporal or historical sense. Rather, ultimate
laws turn out to be temporally indexed. They all have a starting date, so
to speak, which doesn’t necessarily correspond to the date the world begun
(if it ever begun on some specified date)9.
Mill’s growing view of the humean mosaic and the laws that come with it
has an important impact on the very structuring of science itself. It indeed
turns out that any true deductive system of law statements, which achieves
the best combination of strength and simplicity at some given time ti, be-
comes immediately obsolete as soon as some breach in [PCC] occurs, insofar
as, then, it immediately loses strength by being unable to accommodate the
new extension of the mosaic. As a result, one has to run the competition
afresh with respect to the newly extended mosaic.
To understand what the result of such new competition has to be, two
preliminary remarks are in order. First, in Mill’s view, it is of course possible
for heteropathic laws to combine homopathically (or for heteropathic effects
to subsequently combine as homopathic causes of further effects). As a
9Obviously, this strongly departs from Lewis’ version of the [BSA]. In Mill’s broadly
empiricist worldview, there is no sense in claiming that heteropathic laws do exist before
the corresponding breach in [PCC], even as uninstantiated laws, for then (i) the funda-
mental property instances on which these laws supervene do not exist, and (ii) these laws
are impossible to know in principle (be it by induction or deduction). For more detail on
Mill’s [BSA] in relation with temporality, see section 6.
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result, once a new domain of events Di has emerged, these events generally
combine in such a way as their joint effects also belong to Di. Accordingly,
each domain has its own regularities. Some of them are ultimate, in the
sense of being about the fundamental property instances of that domain,
and the others are derivative, as they only obtain in virtue of a homopathic
combination of these fundamental property instances. As it turns out, an
intra-domain competition can then be run independently for every domain
Di, the result of which being the deductive system that best systematizes
the events of Di. Such a system has the ultimate and the derivative laws of
Di as its axioms and its theorems, respectively, and is constitutive of a free-
standing special science10. In Mill’s own words, with Di being the chemical
or the physiological domain (1884, 245):
“[T]here is no reason to despair of ultimately raising chemistry
and physiology to the condition of deductive sciences; for though
it is impossible to deduce all chemical and physiological truths
from the laws or properties of simple substances or elementary
agents, they may possibly be deducible from laws which com-
mence when these elementary agents are brought together into
some moderate number of not very complex combinations. The
Laws of Life will never be deducible from the mere laws of the
ingredients, but the prodigiously complex Facts of Life may all
be deducible from comparatively simple laws of life [...].”
That brings us to the second remark. Mill’s way of talking sometimes
erroneously suggests that heteropathic laws can contravene previous laws11.
Of course, literally, that cannot be the case. Consistently with [RVL], once
an event is not obtaining, as in the case of the separate effects ekj in an
heteropathic situation, there simply is no law “out there” that is prevented
from “acting”, as humean laws only supervene on occurrent events. Accord-
ingly, laws that belong to a domain Di−1 remain laws of that domain, even
after a domain Di and its own laws have emerged therefrom. In particular,
10For a similar idea, see Schrenk 2017. Mill can here be seen as promoting an ontological
variant of Cohen and Callender (2009)’s essentially perspectival version of the [BBSA],
where the boundaries of the domains in which competitions have to be run are fixed by
way of stipulation.
11But he also sometimes clearly indicates that this is not the case, as when he claims
that “[t]hose bodies [parts of a vegetable or animal substance] continue, as before, to obey
mechanical and chemical laws, in so far as the operation of those laws is not counteracted
by the new laws which govern them as organized beings” (1884 245). Note that, given
[RVL], the use of expressions like “obey” and “govern” is certainly unfortunate here.
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neither “overlaps” nor “conflicts” are expected to occur between the laws of
these domains, insofar as, by definition, they are regularities among differ-
ent fundamental property instances of the growing humean mosaic. This is
not a trivial point, as it is this very ingredient of Mill’s take on emergence
that allows for science to remain a unified endeavor, despite the existence,
within it, of several quasi-autonomous special sciences, each having its own
best deductive system that is true to its own domain. As such, a separate,
inter-domain competition can then also be run, which will designate the best
deductive system for all domains of events existing at time ti. This system
will invariably contain, as axioms, all the axioms of the first domain-specific
best system – D1 or physics – together with all the heteropathic laws that
have appeared upon each and every breach in [PCC] before ti, and which
act as inter-domain ultimate bridge-laws. In this spirit, with respect to the
unification of physics and chemistry, Mill contends that (1884 246):
“[I]n chemistry, these undiscovered laws [the heteropathic laws]
of the dependence of the properties of the compound on the
properties of its elements, may, together with the laws of the
elements themselves, furnish the premises by which the science
is perhaps destined one day to be rendered deductive”.
6 The dynamical unity of science
Fig. 3 and 4 summarize the upshot of the discussion so far. They can both
be seen as representing an emergent evolution of some sort, of which the
relevant steps can be described as follows.
At the very origin of the world – whenever that may be, let’s say at
t1 –, there was nothing but physical events that combined homopathically,
to the effect that the best deductive system D∗1 that was true to the only
domain D1 of the mosaic only contained, as axioms, the ultimate laws of
physics (as humean laws, these laws span the whole temporal extension of
D1, from t1 onwards until the end of time). At some later time t2, a first
breach in [PCC] occurred, and a new domain D2 of fundamental property
instances – those of chemistry – emerged. Although D∗1 then remained the
best deductive system available for D1 – for no law was to be contravened
upon the breach in [PCC] –, it failed to appropriately systematize the events
of D2, and hence could not qualify as the best system for the mosaic at t2,
that is, D1 ∪ D2. Two new competitions were then to be run. Building
on the fact that chemical events also generally combined among themselves
homopathically, the first competition, internal to D2, designated D∗2 as the
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Figure 3: Mill’s growing humean mosaic, where new quasi-autonomous domains
of events Di keep stacking on one another upon each breach in [PCC]. Emergence
is here what accounts for the existence of the various special sciences.
best system for D2, making chemistry a deductive science with its own ax-
ioms and theorems (again, the corresponding laws span the whole temporal
extension of D2, from t2 onwards until the end of time). With respect to
a second competition, this time run against D1 ∪ D2, the best deductive
system that came out was the one that had, as axioms, the axioms of D∗1
together will the inter-domain, heteropathic laws Li12 (of the form Li(C,E),
with C and E belonging to D1 and D2, respectively). The story then kept
repeating itself relative to the advent of the other domains of the mosaic
and their corresponding special sciences, predicated on the further assump-
tions that the biological domain (D3) emerged from the chemical domain
(D2), the psychological domain (D4) emerged from the biological domain
(D3), etc. At the end of time, the whole of science is in principle to be
rendered fully deductive. The final best system D∗ will have, as axioms, the
axioms of physics together with all the heteropathic laws which obtained on
the occasion of each and every breach in [PCC] that occurred throughout
history.
It is clear from such discussion that Mill’s version of the [BSA] essentially
differs from Lewis’, in that the former considers the supervenience basis of
any law of nature to be temporally restricted to a given time interval [ti,∞],
while for the later it invariably consists of the whole history of the universe
(so that ti is always arbitrarily set to zero). Restricting, as Mill does, the
period over which some nomic regularities obtain and, accordingly, some
best system prevails, isn’t prima facie inconsistent, even if it can strike as
strongly counter-intuitive. As Lange recently put it (2008, 88-89):
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Figure 4: Mill’s growing humean mosaic and the science that best systematizes
it. Though the domains of events Di are not connected in any ontologically sig-
nificant way, the associated best deductive systems D∗i can all be unified into a
single deductive system at any time. This provides a diagrammatical picture of
McLaughlin’s claim that Millian laws “cluster into systematically related groups”
(1992, 63).
“On Lewis’s account, the laws are immutable, since the laws
at each moment are fixed in the same way by the same thing:
the universe’s complete history of elite-property instantiations.
However, Lewis’s account entails the laws’ immutability only be-
cause a certain parameter in the account has been set to ‘the
universe’s entire history’. That parameter could be set differ-
ently. For example, there is a deductive system of truths having
the best combination of simplicity and informativeness regarding
the elite-property instantiations during a given period. I see no
grounds on which Lewis’s account could object to deeming the
members of that system to be the laws during that period”.
That Lewis systematically and artificially fixes the laws’ starting date to
zero is what makes it the case that Mill-style evolutionary emergence can-
not occur in his worldview. Unsurprisingly enough, there is no room for
15
genuine extensions of the humean mosaic in Lewis’ atemporal block uni-
verse ontology. For all the fundamental property instances of the mosaic are
taken to belong to the unique “elite” domain D1 spanning over the whole
history of the world, it is no surprise that the laws of the special sciences
can enjoy no specific autonomy12.
By contrast, and as we’ve already seen, there is a genuine ontological
enforcer of the special sciences’ autonomy in Mill’s version of the [BSA],
namely, the contingent breaches in [PCC] and, with them, the advent of new
domains of the humean mosaic and, correspondingly, of new laws. These
are not to be fixed by – nor do they supervene on – “the universe’s entire
history”, a fact which gives Mill flexibility enough, coherently with Lange’s
words above, to make sense of the set of the world’s laws growing through
time13.
12That this is true with respect to Mill-style “diachronic” emergence is here doubled
by the fact that, according to Lewis, no autonomy for the special sciences is to be found
through “synchronic” emergence either, insofar as, according to Lewis himself (1994, 53),
“supervenience is reduction”. The distinction between diachronic and synchronic varieties
of emergence is addressed in section 7. Concerning the impossibility to have diachronic
ontological emergence in a block universe ontology, see also Humphreys (2016, 220-227).
13Ultimately, that his emergentism can even get off the ground seems to proceed from
the fact that Mill implicitly departs from eternalism to embrace (at least some elements
of) a growing block universe theory of time. True, it would certainly be vain to claim
that Mill actually endorsed an explicit theory of time. Yet, from what has been said so
far, it appears that the only available option for Mill is to endorse a kind of mixed view,
located somewhere between eternalism and past-presentism. It should indeed be the case
that each and every quasi-autonomous domain Di of the mosaic is a self-contained block
sub-universe, where nothing new comes into being through time, as therein causes only
combine homopathically. It is only through occasional breaches in [PCC] that some new
fundamental property instances come into being, when it happens that causes combine
heteropathically. Emily Thomas (forthcoming) recently contended that Samuel Alexan-
der, though certainly eternalist, endorsed such a mixed view with regard to some putative
cases of emergence (actually the ones related to the quality of deity), and that such lean-
ing towards a growing block universe view certainly inspired Charlie Broad’s subsequent
philosophy of time, which is usually considered as the ultimate origin of the view (Earman
2008). It is noteworthy that such a mixed view allows for a possible – if perhaps costly –
reconciliation between humeanism and (elements of) a growing block universe view, recon-
ciliation which is notoriously unstable (see for instance Briggs & Forbes (2017), where the
core of the argument to the effect that humeanism and a growing block view cannot both
be true partly rests on the contention that a proposition like “There will be a lunar eclipse
on January 21, 2019” is a generic, arbitrary claim. This is certainly false in a Millian
set-up, insofar as astronomical laws are paradigmatically homopathic, to the effect that
the authors’ argument do not generalize to the heteropathic cases, which are the ones that
really matter).
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7 Defining humean emergence
We are now sufficiently equipped to capture the core of Mill’s emergence
with the help of semi-formal definitions. Formulating such an emergence
may be achieved in two equivalent ways, causal and nomic, bearing in mind
that, in both cases, what ultimately emerges is a new fundamental property
instance of the humean mosaic at a certain time14. In line with what has
been said so far, an event Ej can be said to emerge at time tj > ti as soon
as:
[Causal formulation]
(i) Ej is caused by a combination of causes R(c1i , ..., cni ), such
that each single cki in isolation would have caused ekj ; and
(ii) Ej is different from (any) R(∗)(e1j , ..., enj ).
[Nomic formulation]
(i) It is a law that Ej regularly follows from R(c1i , ..., cni ), to the
effect that L(R(c1i , ..., cni ), Ej) is part of the best system D∗; and
(ii) this law is an ultimate law, to the effect that it is an axiom
of the best system D∗.
Here Ej belongs to a domain Dj , while each cki and R(c1i , ..., cni ) belong to
Di. L(R(c1i , ..., cni ), Ej) is a bridge-law connecting Di to Dj , and it belongs
to the best system D∗, which is either the final best system D∗, or the best
system D∗j available at tj for systematizing D1 ∪ ... ∪Dj−1 ∪Dj .
Both these formulations render explicit what might appear today as an
ambiguity in Mill’s emergence, which is probably responsible for the fact
that two distinct contemporary varieties of emergence, synchronic emergence
and diachronic emergence, are both taken to ultimately trace back to Mill’s
homopathic/heteropathic distinction. In the proposed definitions, there are
indeed two possible ways of deciding what the emergence basis of Ej actually
is.
A first prima facie plausible option in this respect is to consider that
the joint effect Ej emerges from the set of the “underlying”, separate effects
{ekj }. Such a possible construal of Mill’s emergence is commensurate with
the traditional holist canon according to which “the whole is more than the
14Following what has been said in footnote 7, though it is in line with Mill’s own way
of talking, the fact that the emergence relation can be construed in causal terms has to
be taken with a pinch of salt, as heteropathic combinations of causes are such that, by
definition, the condition of unconditionalness fails to hold.
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sum of its parts”, and seems at first glance congruent with his own example
of water being more than hydrogen and oxygen. As such, this first line of
thought is in line with the synchronic/holistic tradition of emergentism, ac-
cording to which emergents are those higher-level units – objects, properties,
laws, what have you – that are both dependent on, and autonomous from,
underlying, lower-level and simultaneous units, in the spirit of a “layer-cake”
ontology of levels of nature, described by a science that has a corresponding
stratified structure.
Yet, serious reasons indicate that it is a mistake to construe Mill’s emer-
gence in this way. Indeed, as we’ve seen, there is no way in which one could
consider that an emergent joint effect Ej synchronically depends on the set of
the separate effects {ekj }, for in general they are not co-instantiated (it could
even be the case that none of the ekj were ever occurrent in the whole history
of the universe). Accordingly, and contrary to the present orthodoxy (some-
what ironically) fixed by Kim (see e.g. 1999; or 2006), Mill’s emergence is
not essentially tied to mereological supervenience, a relation with respect to
which the autonomy of emergents is notoriously difficult to come by. Con-
struing Mill’s emergence under the canonical, synchronic mold articulated
around supervenience would indeed force one to consider – as McLaughlin
seems to do (1992, 65), although with much precaution – that Mill actually
embraced some version of property pluralism and, with it, the existence of
higher-level configurational forces. But although it is arguable that subse-
quent non-humean causal/nomic realists of the synchronic/holistic tradition
did embrace the existence of such controversial forces in order to enforce
their emergence ascriptions, this is utterly inconsistent with Mill’s broadly
humean worldview15. For one thing, composite entities like water do not
“influence” or “modify” the behavior of other entities, among which their
own components, simply because, given [RVC], there is nothing in causation
that goes beyond mere regularity. Another way to put it is to re-emphasize
that Mill’s heteropathic laws do not contravene other laws, among which
the one about the separate causes and effects, for, given [RVL], when the
separate effects do not obtain, there is simply no law “out there” that can be
contravened. Equivalently, Mill’s heteropathic laws do not “govern” or “reg-
ulate” the behavior of underlying or subvening components, for governing
and regulating are simply not what humean laws do.
15As such, Mill’s emergence stands in sharp contrast with, say, Samuel Alexander’s.
Though it is a topic of controversy whether or not Alexander did really believe in non-
physical configurational forces – e.g. McLaughlin (1992) says he did, but Gillett (2006)
contends he did not –, what is uncontroversial is that Alexander’s position was one of the
pioneering steps in the synchronic/holistic tradition of emergence.
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This leaves us with the second, more plausible option: Ej ’s emergence
basis, on which it depends and from which it is autonomous, is its antecedent
cause R(c1i , ..., cni ). Put differently, in Mill’s emergence, the relevant de-
pendence relation is the one that is subsumed under the heteropathic law
L(R(c1i , ..., cni ), Ej). Incidentally, the recognition of this fact recently led
philosophers to consider Mill as the progenitor, not of the synchronic, but
of the dynamical or diachronic tradition of emergence (O’Connor & Wong
2015; Humphreys 2016). Whether or not Mill himself construed his emer-
gence as involving changes in levels certainly is a subtle matter of exegesis,
in which I do not wish to enter here (though, as far as I know, Mill never
explicitly subscribed to a “layer-cake” ontology, nor did he ever use the word
“level” in his Logic). Still, what seems uncontroversial is that holism is at
best parasitic of Mill’s emergence, for which the core is, as we’ve seen, that
the humean mosaic happens to grow through time.
The fact that Mill’s emergence is best construed as diachronic is of
the utmost importance when it comes to the very possibility of reconciling
humeanism with emergence. For whether one is inclined to define synchronic
emergence on the basis of either (i) supervenience (van Cleve 1990) or, on
the contrary, (ii) some failure of supervenience (Loewer 1996), both these
options outrightly conflict with mainstream, Lewisian humeanism. In such
light indeed, not only does supervenience amount to reducibility (against
(i); Lewis 1994), but also the existence of putatively emergent, hence non-
supervenient, things directly conflicts with [HS] (against (ii))16. No issue of
this kind plagues diachronic emergentism, for then what ultimately emerges
– fundamental property instances – just plainly belong to the humean mo-
saic. Millian emergents are, as it were, among the very tiles of the mosaic
itself – they are to be counted among the world’s “perfectly natural prop-
erties” (Lewis 1983) –, so the question of how they might possibly relate to
such mosaic doesn’t even arise. This also accounts for the fact that Millian
heteropathic laws do supervene on fundamental property instances of the
mosaic – as it should be, given [HS] –, the only difference with conventional
humeanism being that, as we’ve seen, they actually only supervene on a
temporal fraction of it17.
16A third option is of course possible: construing emergence through supervenience –
hence avoiding direct conflict with [HS] –, and supplementing it with an extra ingredient
supposed to ensure irreducibility – hence avoiding Lewisian reductionism (see e.g. Kim
1999, where the ingredient is downward causation). However, reasons independent from
humeanism usually tend to undermine such a strategy (see e.g. Kim’s (2005) own “causal
exclusion argument”).
17It results that Mill’s emergence could be classified as diachronic and ontological. Such
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8 Conclusion
In this paper, I proposed what I consider to be a charitable interpreta-
tion of Mill’s take on lawhood and emergence. The resulting picture may
seem surprising at first glance, as it crystalizes a reconciliation between
two metaphysical options that are usually taken to be conflicting, namely
humeanism and emergentism. Such reconciliation is nonetheless rendered
consistent by taking Mill’s dynamical or diachronic construal of emergence
seriously, construal which infuses his Best System Account of lawhood by
giving it an evolutionary twist. Mill’s paradoxical picture of the unity of sci-
ence is therefore vindicated: special sciences are autonomous from physics
in a non-trivial sense – for their laws cannot in principle be deduced from
the laws of physics –, yet they can all be unified into a unique, final, and
all-encompassing deductive system.
Surely, that humeanism and emergence can peacefully coexist, or that
Best System Laws can happen to come into being through time, has only
been shown here with the force of logical or metaphysical consistency. At no
point did I offer the slightest argument to the effect that such coexistence
ought to be desirable (as, for sure, it comes with a price, besides being,
as Mill’s own illustrations coming from 19th century chemistry and biology
indicate, empirically questionable). It then remains to be seen whether the
resulting picture can be put to work, something that will have to wait for
another time.
an observation, together with the considerations developed in footnote 7, allows for consid-
ering Mill’s emergence as the humean counterpart of recent accounts of “transformational
emergence” (see e.g. Humphreys 2016; or Guay & Sartenaer 2016; Guay & Sartenaer
2018). See also Sartenaer (2018) for an exploration of the way in which transformation
can slightly deviate from causation.
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